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Abstract
I show that the social stratification of academic science can arise
as a result of academics’ preference for reading work of high epistemic
value. This is consistent with a view on which academic superstars are
highly competent academics, but also with a view on which superstars
arise primarily due to luck. I argue that stratification is beneficial if
most superstars are competent, but not if most superstars are lucky.
I also argue that it is impossible to tell whether most superstars are
in fact competent or lucky, or which group a given superstar belongs
to, and hence whether stratification is overall beneficial.
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1 Introduction
Academic superstars are a familiar phenomenon. These academics write the
papers that everyone reads and talks about, they make media appearances,
give presidential addresses, and they win grants and awards. The work of
an academic superstar generally attracts more attention than that of the
average academic.
Attention can be quantified in various ways, e.g., number of papers pub-
lished, citations to those papers, awards received, etc. It is a well-established
empirical fact that, regardless of which metric is used, the vast majority of
academics receives little attention (if any), while a rare few receive a great
deal (Price 1965, Cole and Cole 1973).1
This fact has been called the social stratification of science (or academia)
(Cole and Cole 1973). Stratification is important in studying the social epis-
temology of science. If some academic work receives more attention than
other work, this influences the flow of information in an academic commu-
nity. This may affect, e.g., the consensus that an academic community settles
on for a particular question.
In this paper I raise the question whether the phenomenon of stratification
serves the aims of academic science.2 I argue that the answer to this question
depends largely on how one thinks academic superstars are distinguished
from academic nobodies. In particular, what are the roles of competence
and luck in distinguishing the two groups?
1For example, the distribution of citations follows a “power law”: the number of papers
that gets cited n times is proportional to n−α for some α. Redner (1998) estimates α to
be around 3.
2Some care should be taken in using the phrase “the aims of academic science”. Aca-
demic science is not a monolithic enterprise, uniformly directed at some aim or set of
aims. Here I seek to identify ways in which stratification may be beneficial or harmful
to groups of academics and academic institutions, as distinct from the ways individual
academics may be helped or harmed by their own place in this stratified social structure.
This introduction uses “the aims of academic science” as a shorthand for that. In the rest
of the paper I will be more specific.
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I start by introducing some toy models which illustrate the different roles
that competence and luck might play (section 2). In this section important
concepts such as “competence”, “luck”, “attention”, and “superstars” are left
at an intuitive level (to be filled out more precisely later).
In section 3 I develop a formal model focusing on how academics decide
which papers to read. In section 4 I develop the idea that papers may dif-
fer in “epistemic value” and that small differences in epistemic value can
lead to large differences in attention; large enough to match the pattern of
stratification described above.
Section 5 returns to the notion of competence. I show that the model
is consistent with a scenario in which stratification in science is purely com-
petence-based. I argue that on this view stratification serves the aims of
academic science, because it makes it easier to identify competent academics,
whose past and future work is likely to be of high epistemic value.
In contrast, section 6 focuses on the less optimistic lessons that can be
drawn from the model. I show that the model is also consistent with a
scenario in which stratification is determined by a large component of ran-
domness. Because they cannot be distinguished by their past performance,
it is impossible to separate the lucky superstars from the competent ones.
But the epistemic benefit of stratification derives exactly from the ability to
identify competent academics, or so I argue. It follows that stratification ei-
ther hinders the aims of academic science, or, if it does help, it is impossible
to show this.
2 Some Intuitions For Competence and Luck
The purpose of this section is to develop some intuitions for the notions
of competence and luck as they will be used in this paper. Consider the
following toy models.
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Toy Model 1. Suppose a group of scientists are interested in the same
experiments. Suppose also that each scientist has a fixed amount of time to
perform experiments; perhaps they are all in a one-year post-doc and they
need to produce a paper at the end of it. Suppose further that the more
competent a scientist is, the more replications she can perform in that time.
And suppose finally that the work of a scientist who has performed more
replications receives more attention. It follows that the superstars3 in this
toy model are exactly the most competent scientists.
In the foregoing, differences in productivity among the scientists are the
result of differences in competence. Contrast a case in which differences in
productivity among scientists are entirely random.
Toy Model 2. Consider again a group of scientists who have a fixed amount
of time to perform experiments. But now suppose that the equipment avail-
able to each scientist restricts their productivity so that each scientist can
perform exactly n replications in the available time. However, the equipment
is not perfectly reliable, so that each replication succeeds (yields usable data)
with probability α, and fails with probability 1− α.
Suppose as before that the work of those scientists who performed more
replications receives more attention. Since in this toy model the only differ-
ence between the scientists is in the probabilistic behavior of their equipment,
the superstars are those lucky scientists for whom all n replications succeed
(which happens with probability αn if the success probabilities are indepen-
dent).
What is the difference between these two toy models? From an external
perspective, not much. A group of scientists perform some experiments, and
those who come up with more replications receive more attention.
3If the scientists are post-docs, most likely none of them are superstars in an absolute
sense. The “superstars” in this community are relative: their work receives more attention
than that of the other post-docs in this group. In an absolute sense, “rising stars” might
be a more appropriate name. Cf. my discussion of the Matthew effect in section 5.
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Intuitively, the difference from an internal perspective is that there is
something systematic about differences in competence that does not exist
when the differences are due to luck. In the first toy model, we should expect
the same scientists to perform the most replications next year. Whereas in
the second model, all scientists are equally likely to have a lot of successful
replications in the next year, except insofar as their differential productivity
in the previous year has affected their employment or funding situation.
This will be the key difference between competence and luck in the dis-
cussion of competent and lucky superstars in sections 5 and 6. Competent
superstars are those for whom good past academic work is predictive of good
future academic work, while lucky superstars are those for whom good past
academic work is not indicative of the value of their future work.4
The next toy model includes both factors—competence and luck—at the
same time. It seems plausible that in such a situation, the systematic contri-
bution of competence outweighs the unsystematic contribution of luck. But
proposition 1, below, shows that this is not necessarily the case.
Toy Model 3. Suppose as before that scientists have time to perform n
replications, each of which succeeds or fails independently from the others
with some fixed probability. Competence is reflected in the value of that
probability. Suppose further that there are just two types of scientists: aver-
age scientists, whose success probability for each replication is α, and good
scientists, whose success probability is β (0 < α < β < 1). As before the
superstars are those scientists for whom all n replications succeed.
Let p denote the proportion of good scientists. It seems plausible that
good scientists are rare: most scientists are of average quality. It turns out
that if good scientists are sufficiently rare, the chance that a given superstar
4Although Louis Pasteur’s claim that “Fortune favors only the prepared mind” suggests
otherwise. See McKinnon (2014) and Merton and Barber (2004, chapter 9) for discussion of
the relation between competence and luck. The kind of luck that results from competence
counts as competence as far as this paper is concerned. My aim is to take seriously the
implications of the possibility of a kind of luck that is independent from competence.
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is a good scientist may be arbitrarily small.
To make this more precise, suppose one draws a scientist at random from
the group. Let g denote the proposition that the scientist drawn is a good
scientist and let s denote the proposition that the scientist is a superstar.
Proposition 1. For all ε > 0 there exists a proportion of good scientists
p ∈ (0, 1) such that Pr(g | s) ≤ ε.
Proof. Let ε > 0. Assume ε < 1 (otherwise the result is trivial). Choose
p = αnε
βn(1−ε)+αnε . Since the superstars are those for whom all replications
succeed, Pr(s | g) = βn and Pr(s | ¬g) = αn. Therefore
Pr(g | s) = Pr(s | g)pPr(s | g)p+ Pr(s | ¬g)(1− p)
=
βnαnε
βn(1−ε)+αnε
βnαnε+αnβn(1−ε)
βn(1−ε)+αnε
= α
nβnε
αnβn
= ε.
Note that while competence and luck are both present in toy model 3,
their effects are modulated by how they affect the number of replications
each scientist is able to perform. That is, whether a given scientist becomes
a superstar is not directly a function of how competent or lucky they are, but
rather a function of how their competence or luck translates into replications.
These toy models have a number of unrealistic features. The idea that
whether a scientist becomes a superstar depends only on the number of repli-
cations they perform is one of them. While this assumption will be dropped
in the next section, I retain the idea that competence and luck do not af-
fect superstar status directly, but rather via what I will call the “epistemic
value” of papers. In the next two sections I make the notions of epistemic
value, attention, and superstars more precise, and show how small differences
in epistemic value among papers can generate the characteristic pattern of
social stratification in science. This is consistent with either competence,
luck, or a combination of both being responsible for creating differences in
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epistemic value between papers. I return to discussing competence and luck
explicitly in sections 5 and 6.
3 A Model of Academics Reading Papers
This section presents a formal model of information exchange in an academic
community. The guiding idea is that each academic does some experiments
and publishes the results in a paper. Academics may then choose to read each
other’s papers depending on their interests. The model focuses on the “short
run”, that is, academics’ reading behavior in the context of one research
project or paper.
Viewing the academics as nodes and the choice to read a paper as a
(directed) edge yields a network. In section 4 the idea of “attention for
academic work” is given a precise interpretation using a concept from network
theory called in-degree. Because the structure of this network depends on
the academics’ choices, this is a model of (strategic) network formation in
the sense of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).5
The purpose of this model is to show that certain small differences among
papers are sufficient to generate patterns in the resulting network that are
similar to those observed in real academic networks. That is, most academic
work receives little or no attention, while a small amount of work receives a
great deal of attention (a phenomenon I called stratification in the introduc-
tion).
5Contrast this with recent philosophical work on epistemic networks, which compared
the performance of different network structures on various epistemic desiderata (Zollman
2010, Grim et al. 2013). In this work the network structures being compared are fixed
in advance, rather than formed endogenously. Such work is thus complimentary to the
type of model considered here. However, this paper differs from Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) in that pairwise stability and other notions of equilibrium are not a key issue.
This is because forming an edge in my model is a unilateral act (an academic does not
need another academic’s permission to read her paper). In the terminology of Zollman
(2013, section 2), this is a “one way, one pays” information transmission model without
second-hand communication.
7
The importance of the results obtained from the model is to show that
the mechanisms of competence and luck I outlined in section 2 are (at least
in principle) sufficient for generating the pattern of stratification observed
empirically. This secures the foundations for the subsequent discussion of
these mechanisms: if either competence or luck can create these patterns, we
may legitimately ask if either or both of them do.
It may be remarked that the characteristic pattern of social stratification
in science already has a standard generating mechanism in the literature.
This mechanism is described by so-called preferential attachment models
(Barabási and Albert 1999). In a preferential attachment model new papers
cite older papers proportional to the number of citations that older paper
already has.
It can be shown that this generates a power law distribution of citations
with an exponent equal to three (Barabási and Albert 1999). This is very
close to what is observed in real citation data (Redner 1998, cf. footnote 1
above). While this is illuminating in many contexts (for example, in relating
citations to other social phenomena where power laws occur), it does not
address the question at issue in this paper for the following reason.
Preferential attachment models do not include any features that distin-
guish papers from one another (other than their number of citations). So
these models can only explain how existing differences in citations get exac-
erbated, not where these differences came from. In particular, the epistemic
dimension of science (or: its content) is abstracted away entirely. The model
of this paper, at minimum, introduces a way of talking about this.
Consider an academic community, modeled as a set I. Each element
i ∈ I represents an individual academic. I is best thought of as consisting of
academics at a similar stage in their career, e.g., a group of post-docs. I is
assumed to be finite.
Each academic, as part of her own research, performs some “experi-
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ments”.6 Suppose there are m experiments one might do. Each academic’s
research involves doing each of these experiments some (possibly zero) num-
ber of times. Write n(i, j) to denote the number of times academic i performs
experiment j.
The set of results of academic i’s experiments is called her information
set Ai. Experiments are modeled as random variables, with different experi-
ments corresponding to different probability distributions, so an information
set is a set of random variables. Information set Ai thus contains n(i, j)
random variables for each experiment j.
The number of random variables of each type is the main feature I use
to distinguish information sets. On a strict interpretation, this is a modest
generalization of the number of replications that I used in section 2. But there
is an alternative interpretation on which the experiments refer to different
categories academics might use to evaluate each other’s work (e.g., Kuhn’s
accuracy, simplicity, and fruitfulness), and the number of replications of each
experiment gives the score of the academic’s work in that category. More on
this in section 4.
Each academic publishes her information in a paper. In this “short run”
model, each academic publishes a single paper, and this paper contains all
the information in her information set.7
A generalization of my model would have separate sets of academics and
papers, with an information set for each paper. This allows for academics
6While I use the word “experiment” to refer to individual research units, I do not intend
to restrict the model to academic fields that perform experiments. One “experiment”
could be one collision of particles in particle physics, one subject examined in a medical
or psychological study, or one text studied in a corpus analysis.
7Thus, information sets are characteristics that differentiate the academics (nodes)
in the network. Information sets consist of random variables. This generalizes Ander-
son (2016), where academics’ information consists of deterministic bits (called “skills” by
Anderson). Anderson’s model in turn generalizes the early network formation models
(Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Bala and Goyal 2000), where information is additive and
each node has exactly one unit of it. Creating a model of strategic network formation
with heterogeneous nodes and stochasticity constitutes the main technical innovation of
this paper (discussed in more detail in Heesen 2016).
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who publish multiple papers, and academics without papers. For example, if
I is a group of post-docs, senior academics may be included without papers:
their reading choices may influence who among the post-docs becomes a
superstar, but their own papers are irrelevant. Results qualitatively similar
to those presented in section 4 can be derived for this generalization.
Academics can read each other’s papers. Reading a paper means learning
the information in the information set of the academic who wrote the paper.8
The only information that is transferred is that in the information set of the
academic whose paper is being read: the academic who wrote the paper does
not learn anything as a result of this interaction9, nor is there any second-
hand transfer of information.10
What (strategic) decisions do the academics need to make, and what do
they know when they make them? Each academic needs to decide which
papers to read. I do not consider the order in which the different academics
make their decisions. That is, academics do not know what other academics
are reading, or if they do, they ignore this information. But I do allow
that individual academics make their decisions sequentially: after reading a
8Academics learn each other’s experimental results (or evidence) not each other’s con-
clusions as expressed, say, in a posterior probability. In this sense my model differs from
that of Aumann (1976). If academics only learn each other’s posterior on some set of
possible worlds, they may not actually learn anything substantial (Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis 1982, proposition 3).
9Zollman (2013, section 2) calls this “one way” information transmission. In contrast,
“two way” information transmission occurs when an edge in the network allows information
to flow in both directions, such as may happen when two academics meet at a conference.
But since information is transmitted through reading in the present model, “one way”
transmission seems like the more appropriate assumption.
10That is, if academic i has read academic i′’s paper, and then a third academic reads
academic i’s paper, the third academic only learns the contents of the information set
of academic i, not of academic i′. In this way my model differs from other information
transmission models, e.g., those by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal
(2000). There are two reasons for this. First, academic i’s paper presumably focuses on
reporting academic i’s experimental results, not those she learned from others. Second,
even if some iterated transfer of information happened, and the third academic learned
something interesting about academic i′’s work this way, one might expect her to then
read the paper by academic i′ as well.
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paper they may use what they have learned in deciding what to read next
(or whether to stop reading). After all, often one only becomes interested in
reading a paper after reading some other paper, and such a decision can be
made on short notice.
In contrast, due to the time and cost involved in designing and running an
experiment, which experiments to run is not changed as easily. I assume that
in the “short run”, which this model focuses on, it cannot be changed at all.
The type and number of experiments performed by each academic is taken as
fixed. The model can be viewed as looking only at the time associated with a
single research project: doing some experiments and exchanging results with
epistemic peers. More on the import of this assumption in sections 5 and 6.
Academics are assumed to know, before choosing to read a paper, how
many replications of each type of experiment it contains (that is, they know
the values n(i, j) for all i and j). My justification for this assumption is
as follows.11 The time required to search for papers on a certain subject
(perhaps looking at some titles and abstracts) is negligible compared to the
time required to actually read papers and obtain the information in them.
Idealizing somewhat, I suppose that the title and abstract contain enough in-
formation to determine the type and number of experiments, but not enough
to learn the results in full detail. Alternatively, in relatively small academic
communities this assumption may be justified because everyone knows what
everyone else is working on through informal channels.
So academics choose sequential decision procedures (Wald 1947), which
specify what to read as a function of information gained from their own
research and papers they have already read. Because that information takes
the form of random variables, the decision procedure itself is also random.
A simple example illustrates this.
Example 1. Suppose that there are two possible worlds, a and b. Suppose
11Cf. section 6, where I argue that dropping this assumption does not affect the conclu-
sions I draw there.
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that there is one experiment and each academic has performed that experi-
ment once. In world a, the experiment outputs either a zero or a one, each
with probability 1/2. In world b the experiment always outputs a one. So
upon observing a zero an academic is certain to be in world a.
Consider an academic who initially thinks she is equally likely to be in
either world and uses the decision procedure “read papers until you are at
least 99% certain which world you are in”. Assume world a is the actual world.
Then she reads no papers with probability 1/2 (if her own experiment yields
a zero), one paper with probability 1/4 (if she saw a one but the first paper
she reads has a zero), and so on. So a decision procedure does not specify
which papers to read, but it specifies the probability of reading them.
In the next section I put some constraints on the way academics choose
a sequential decision procedure.
4 Superstars in the Model
How do academics choose which papers to read? One might want to assume
that academics have some form of utility function which they maximize. But
this has a number of problems: whether (expected) utility maximization
can provide a good model of rationality is controversial; and even if it is a
good model of rationality academics may not act rationally so the descriptive
power of the model may be poor.
Moreover, one would need to argue for the specific form of the utility
function, requiring a detailed discussion of academics’ goals. For example,
if academics aim only at truth an epistemic utility function may be needed,
and it is not clear what that should look like (Joyce 1998, Pettigrew 2016).
If they aim only at credit or recognition (as in Strevens 2003), a pragmatic
utility function is needed. If they aim at both truth and credit (as seems
likely) these two types of utility function must be combined (Kitcher 1993,
chapter 8; see also Bright forthcoming for a comparison of these three types
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of utility function), and if they have yet other goals things get even more
complicated.
Here I take a different approach. I state two assumptions, or behavioral
rules, that constrain academics’ choices to some extent (although they still
leave a lot of freedom). I then show that these assumptions are sufficient for
the appearance of superstars in the model.
For those who think that, despite the problems I mentioned, academics’
behavior should be modeled using (Bayesian) expected utility theory, I show
that a wide range of utility functions would lead academics to behave as the
assumptions require (see theorems 1 and 2). For those who are impressed
by the problems of that approach, I argue that one should expect academics
to behave as the assumptions require even if they are not maximizing some
utility function.
The first assumption relies on the notion that a paper may have higher
epistemic value than another. I first state the formal definition of higher
epistemic value and the assumption before discussing how they are intended
to be interpreted.
Consider the information sets (i.e., papers) of two academics, i and i′. Say
that academic i’s paper is of higher epistemic value than academic i′’s paper if
academic i has performed at least as many replications of each experiment as
academic i′, and more replications overall. Formally, Ai is of higher epistemic
value than Ai′ (written Ai′ @ Ai) if n(i, j) ≥ n(i′, j) for all experiments j,
with n(i, j) > n(i′, j) for at least one j.12
The “higher epistemic value” relation is a partial order. For example,
if academic i has performed experiment 1 ten times and experiment 2 zero
times, and academic 2 has performed experiment 1 zero times and experi-
ment 2 five times, neither paper has higher epistemic value than the other.
12The reason for the “@” notation is that this relation among information sets is closely
related to the usual set-theoretic relation of inclusion “⊂”. See Heesen (2016, section 2.2)
for more on this.
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Assumption 1 (Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value). If academic i’s
paper has higher epistemic value than academic i′’s (Ai′ @ Ai) then other
academics prefer to read academic i’s paper over academic i′’s.
On a strict interpretation, Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value requires
that academics prefer to read papers that contain more replications (of those
experiments that they are interested in reading about in the first place).
For example in the medical sciences, where the number of replications might
refer to the number of patients studied, a higher number of replications would
correspond to more reliable statistical tests, and would as such be preferable.
The strict interpretation, however, probably has limited application. Aca-
demics presumably care about more than just the quantity of data in a pa-
per when they judge its epistemic value (although it should be noted that
Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value will usually not fix academics’ pref-
erences completely, leaving at least some room for other considerations to
play a role). For example, an important consideration may be what, if any,
theoretical advances are made by the paper. How could such a consideration
be incorporated in the model?
One suggestion is to consider the theoretical advances made by the paper
as an additional experiment, and to define the number of replications of
the additional experiment as a qualitative measure of the importance of the
theoretical advances. Assuming that academics will mostly agree on the
relative importance of theoretical advances this idea can be made to fit the
structure of the model.
This suggests a looser interpretation of the notion of higher epistemic
value in Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value (one I alluded to in section 3).
On this interpretation the different “experiments” are categories academics
use to judge the epistemic value of papers, and “replications” are just a way
to score papers on these categories. Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value
then says that academics will not read a paper if another paper is available
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that scores at least as well or better on all categories.13
The loose interpretation makes a more complete picture of academics’
judgments of epistemic value possible, at the cost of some level of formal
precision. But on either interpretation Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value
may be unrealistically simple. Given that there is, to my knowledge, no
research trying to model academics’ decisions what to read, Always Prefer
Higher Epistemic Value should be read as a tentative first step. Future
research may fruitfully explore improved or alternative ways of making the
factors that go into such decisions formally precise.
The second assumption gets its plausibility from the observation that
there is a finite limit to how many papers an academic can read, simply
because it is humanly impossible to read more. More formally, there exists
some number N (say, a million) such that for any academic the probability
(as implied by her decision procedure) that she reads more than N papers is
zero.
But rather than making this assumption explicitly, I assume something
strictly weaker: that the probability of reading a very large number of papers
is very small.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Reading Probabilities). Let pi,A,n denote the prob-
ability that academic i reads the papers of at least n academics with infor-
mation set A.14 For every ε > 0, there exists a number N that does not
depend on the academic or the size of the academic community, such that
n · pi,A,n ≤ ε · pi,A,1 for all n > N .15
13More formally, academics only read papers on the Pareto frontier. But note that the
Pareto frontier may change with each paper that is read. Any paper may eventually get
read by a given academic; Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value merely requires that the
academic first reads any papers of higher epistemic value than that paper.
14An academic has information set A if her information set contains the same number
of realizations of each experiment as A does. See Heesen (2016, section 2.2) for more on
what this means formally.
15Note that the assumption distinguishes the number of times the academic reads a
paper with a given information set. This is because for technical reasons, I need to distin-
guish between cases where pi,A,1 is zero (i.e., the academic never reads any papers with
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So Bounded Reading Probabilities says that for very high numbers, the
probability of reading that number of papers is very small, independent of the
academic reading or the size of the academic community. If, as I suggested
above, no academic ever reads more than a million papers, then pi,A,n = 0
for all i and A whenever n is greater than a million, and so the assumption
would be satisfied.
As I indicated, these assumptions are not only independently plausible,
but are also satisfied by Bayesian academics (who maximize expected utility)
under quite general conditions. The most important of these conditions is
that reading a paper has a fixed cost c. This cost reflects the opportunity
cost of the time spent reading the paper.16
The relation between my assumptions and Bayesian rationality is ex-
pressed in the following two theorems. The proofs are given in Heesen (2016,
section 3).
Theorem 1. If c > 0 and if each replication of an experiment is probabilis-
tically independent and has a positive probability of changing the academic’s
future choices, then the way a fully Bayesian rational academic chooses what
to read satisfies Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value.
Theorem 2. If c > 0 and if each replication of an experiment is probabilis-
tically independent, then a community of fully Bayesian rational academics
with the same prior probabilities over possible worlds and the same utility
functions chooses what to read in a way that satisfies Bounded Reading Prob-
abilities.
Now consider the graph or network formed by viewing each academic as a
node, and drawing an arrow (called an arc or directed edge in graph theory)
information set A) and cases where pi,A,1 is positive. But for interpreting the assumption
this is mostly irrelevant, because the number of papers with a given information set an
academic reads is always less than the total number of papers she reads.
16Note also that without such a cost the unrealistic and uninteresting result would be
that academics read every paper (Good 1967). For this reason a cost is commonly included
in models of this kind (Zollman 2013, section 2).
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from node i to node i′ whenever academic i reads academic i′’s paper.17
In order to study social stratification in this network, I need a metric to
identify superstars. A natural idea suggests itself: rank academics by the
number of academics who read their work. In the network, the number of
academics who read i’s work is simply the number of arrows ending at i. In
graph-theoretical terms, this is the in-degree of node i. This idea is illustrated
in figure 1.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7
1 2
3 4
5 6
Figure 1: Two networks for small academic communities. The network on the
left is highly stratified (academic 7 has in-degree 6 while the other academics
have in-degree 0). The network on the right is egalitarian (all academics have
in-degree 1).
If, as the empirical evidence suggests, science is highly stratified, then one
should expect large differences in in-degree among academics. Theorem 3,
below, says that this is exactly what happens in my model.
The theorem relates the average in-degrees of academics (denoted, e.g.,
E [d(A)] for the average in-degree of an academic with information set A).18
17More formally, the graph of interest is G = (I, {(i, i′) ∈ I2 | i reads i′}), where I is
the set of nodes and {(i, i′) ∈ I2 | i reads i′} is the set of arcs.
18Recall that an academic has information set A if her information set contains the same
number of realizations of each experiment as A does.
E [d(A)] denotes an average in two senses. First, it averages over all academics with
information set A. Second, it takes the mean over all the possible graphs that may arise
due to the probabilistic nature of individual academics’ decisions to form connections.
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In particular, it relates the average in-degrees of academics with information
sets A and B to that of academics with information sets AunionsqB and AuB. An
academic has information set AunionsqB if she has performed each experiment as
many times as an academic with information set A or an academic with in-
formation set B, whichever is higher (whereas an academic with information
set A uB takes the lower value for each experiment).19
For example, if information set A contains twelve replications of experi-
ment 1 and eight replications of experiment 2 and information set B contains
ten replications of each experiment then A unionsq B contains twelve replications
of experiment 1 and ten replications of experiment 2 (and AuB contains ten
and eight replications, respectively). Or, on the loose interpretation, if the
paper represented by information set A makes a greater theoretical advance
than the paper represented by information set B, but B contains valuable
empirical work as well, then information set A unionsq B indicates a paper con-
taining as great a theoretical advance as A, and empirical work as valuable
as that in B.20
Theorem 3 (Stratified In-Degrees). Let I be an academic community satis-
fying Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value and Bounded Reading Probabil-
ities. If I is large enough, then for any two information sets A and B such
that at least one academic in I has information set A unionsqB
E [d(A unionsqB)] + E [d(A uB)] ≥ E [d(A)] + E [d(B)] .
Moreover, if neither A nor B is identical to A unionsq B21 and E [d(A unionsqB)] > 0
19Formally, Ai′′ = AiunionsqAi′ if n(i′′, j) = max{n(i, j), n(i′, j)} for all j, and Ai′′ = AiuAi′
if n(i′′, j) = min{n(i, j), n(i′, j)} for all j. These notions are closely related, but not
identical, to the standard set-theoretic notions of union and intersection. See Heesen
(2016, section 2.2) for details.
20How often does this happen? In social sciences like psychology and economics one fre-
quently sees empirical work included in papers whose primary contribution is theoretical,
or vice versa. This could be interpreted as at least attempting to create situations like
that described in the main text.
21That is, if neither A nor B contains the same number of replications of each experiment
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then the above inequality can be strengthened to
E [d(A unionsqB)] > E [d(A)] + E [d(B)] .
What the theorem says is that if the set of academics is sufficiently large,
the number of times a given paper is read increases rapidly—on average,
faster than linearly—in the epistemic value of the information set. See Heesen
(2016, section 2.5) for a proof.
What do I mean by “faster than linearly”? The following corollary makes
this more precise.22 Suppose that (part of) the academic community only
performs replications of some subset E of the experiments (where E contains
at least two experiments).
Let AE(n) denote an information set containing n replications of each
of the experiments in E (and nothing else). Let nˆ be the highest value
of n such that at least one academic in I has information set AE(n). Say
that I is dense in E if for each combination of number of replications of
the experiments in E some academic has performed exactly that number of
replications.23 The corollary (proven in Heesen 2016, section 2.6) shows that
in dense communities the average number of times a paper is read increases
exponentially in n.
Corollary 1 (Exponential In-Degrees). Let I be an academic community
satisfying Always Prefer Higher Epistemic Value and Bounded Reading Prob-
abilities. Let E be a subset of the experiments (|E| ≥ 2) and suppose that I
is dense in E. If I is large enough, then for all n (with 1 ≤ n ≤ nˆ),
E [d(AE(n))] ≥ 2(n−1)(|E|−1)E [d(AE(1))] .
as A unionsqB.
22Thanks to Dominik Klein for suggesting that I include a corollary along these lines.
23More formally, I is dense in E if for any combination of numbers n1, . . . , nm (where
1 ≤ nj ≤ nˆ if j ∈ E and nj = 0 if j /∈ E) there is an academic i ∈ I such that n(i, j) = nj
for all j.
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The theorem and its corollary show that the pattern of stratification
in my model reflects the pattern that can be seen in empirical metrics of
stratification, e.g., using citation metrics. That is, most papers have few
citations, while a rare few have a great number of citations (Price 1965,
Redner 1998). This pattern is seen to arise from academics’ preference for
papers of high epistemic value. Thus this preference can be viewed as a
sufficient condition for these patterns to arise.
5 A Competence-Based View of Academic Su-
perstars
In this section I show that the results from the previous section are consis-
tent with a purely competence-based view of academic superstars. I argue
for two consequences of this insight. First, one should not be too quick in
concluding that particular patterns of stratification could not have resulted
from differences in competence. Second, if the competence-based view is cor-
rect stratification has some important benefits. The next section considers
the flip side of these arguments.
Stratified In-Degrees, the main result of section 4, identified differences
in the epistemic value of papers as a source of differences in the number of
times they get read (their in-degree in the network). Because differences in
competence can create differences in epistemic value, the result is consistent
with a view on which only the most competent academics become superstars.
Toy model 1 in section 2 illustrates this. Differences in competence can
create differences in the number of replications each academic is able to do,
and by Stratified In-Degrees the most competent academics will be super-
stars.
Speaking more generally, on any interpretation of competence on which
more competent academics tend to write papers of higher epistemic value (on
either the strict or the loose interpretation), the competent academics will
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be the superstars. By Exponential In-Degrees, differences in epistemic value
may be enlarged exponentially in terms of the amount of attention paid to
academic work, as measured in, e.g., citation or productivity metrics.
This casts some suspicion on research that uses linear models to argue that
differences in citation metrics or productivity metrics cannot be explained
by differences in competence (e.g., Cole and Zuckerman 1987, Prpić 2002,
Medoff 2006, Knobloch-Westerwick and Glynn 2013). Their line of reasoning
is roughly as follows:
1. There are differences in citation or productivity metrics that correlate
with measurable characteristics of academics such as academic affilia-
tion (Medoff 2006) or gender (Cole and Zuckerman 1987, Prpić 2002,
Knobloch-Westerwick and Glynn 2013).
2. In a linear model that controls for competence, this correlation is not
explained away.
3. Therefore, differences in competence cannot explain all differences in
citation or productivity metrics.
They would thus use the results of regression analyses to reject the
competence-based view of superstars I outlined. But this conclusion is too
quick. The fact that a model in which competence and citations (or produc-
tivity) stand in a linear relation cannot explain all of the variance in citations
does not rule out the possibility that a model using a nonlinear relation can.
According to my results this may be exactly what is needed.
I do not claim to have shown that their conclusion is incorrect: I think
it is quite plausible that characteristics of academics other than competence
affect citations and productivity. I merely wish to caution against basing
this conclusion on linear models.
For the remainder of this section, suppose that the competence-based
view of superstars I outlined is correct (cf. Cole and Cole 1973, Rosen 1981,
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Strevens 2006). That is, papers of high epistemic value tend to get read
the most, competent academics tend to produce papers of high epistemic
value, and therefore academic superstars are more competent than academic
nobodies.
On this view, the social stratification of science has a number of benefits
for academics and academic institutions. I identify three of them.
First, stratification greatly simplifies the maintenance of consensus in
an academic community. Without a relatively high degree of consensus,
scientific progress might be impossible, as the following quote argues.24
Scientific progress is in part dependent upon maintaining consen-
sus by vesting intellectual authority in stars. Without consensus,
scientists would go off in hundreds of different directions, and
science might lose its cumulative character. The stars in a par-
ticular field determine which ideas are acceptable and which are
not. (Cole and Cole 1973, p. 78)
So stratification seems necessary for progress. But “[i]t is only when the
scientific community sees those exercising authority as deserving of it that the
authority will be accepted” (Cole and Cole 1973, p. 80). If the competence-
based view of superstars is correct, academics can rest assured that those
exercising authority are in fact deserving of it.
Second, stratification can be of use to grant-awarding agencies such as
the NSF and the NIH. In evaluating a research proposal, an important ques-
tion is whether the academic who submitted it will be able to carry it out
successfully. These agencies thus have an interest in estimating the academic
competence of those submitting proposals.
On the competence-based view of superstars, this is easy. Citation metrics
and publication counts provide straightforward measures of competence.25
24Kuhn (1962) makes a similar point.
25At least relatively speaking. If citation metrics or publication metrics were used as if
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Agencies like the NSF or the NIH use this information, presumably for this
reason.
Third, stratification may be used by academics themselves to identify
competent academics. Even if academics who work on very similar things
are able to judge each other’s competence directly, they still lack the time
and the expertise to judge the competence of academics outside their small
range of collaborators and competitors.
This suggests an explanation for the Matthew effect, the observation that
when two academics make the same discovery (either independently or collab-
oratively), the academic who is already a superstar receives more recognition
for it (Merton 1968). On Merton’s own view, it is a result of the fact that
academics pay more attention to papers written by superstars. According
to Merton, this fact aids the efficiency of communication in science, but the
Matthew effect itself is a pathology.
Strevens (2006) goes a step further by arguing that differential recognition
is justified. The idea is that the mere presence of a superstar’s name makes
a paper more trustworthy. In this way the superstar earns the additional
recognition. So the Matthew Effect is not a pathology.
The competence-based view of superstars endorses both suggestions. If
academics use the names of superstars to identify papers to read outside
their own subfield, they will identify papers of high epistemic value, aiding
the efficiency of communication. And because superstars can be trusted to
be competent, putting more trust in papers written by superstars is also
justified.
It is worth noting how the model and the Matthew effect interact here.
The idea is that whenever a paper by a young academic is published, its
epistemic value determines how many academics in the immediate academic
they provided a numerical scale of competence, differences in competence would likely be
exaggerated, as I showed above. But the competence-based view supports judgments like
“Academic i is among the 10% most cited in her field, therefore she is among the 10%
most competent”.
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community of the author will read it. Papers of high epistemic value stand
out, and their authors stand out from their peers.
This is where the “short run” analysis of the model stops. In the longer
run, the Matthew effect takes over. The differences in recognition already
present in the group of young academics are exacerbated as academics further
afield notice the work of the ones that stood out and ignore the work of the
others. If the initial differences in recognition are the result of differences in
competence, the larger subsequent differences in recognition—driven by the
Matthew effect—continue to track competence.
6 A Role For Luck
I have suggested that differences in epistemic value might be responsible for
the social stratification of science (in combination with the Matthew effect).
If this is correct, it does not follow that the competence-based view of super-
stars is correct. In this section I consider the possibility that luck is partially
or wholly responsible for differences in epistemic value. I argue that the mere
fact that this is possible has consequences for evaluating stratification.
To see that luck by itself could produce the patterns typical of socially
stratified academic science, we need only consider toy model 2 from section 2
again. Here, differences in epistemic value between papers are generated
purely randomly, yet by Stratified In-Degrees and Exponential In-Degrees
these differences are sufficient for extremely stratified patterns of attention.
Moreover, toy model 3 and proposition 1 suggested that, at least in some
circumstances, luck can drown out competence.
The consequences drawn in this section regarding luck do not depend
on the particular interpretation of luck given in section 2. Any alternative
interpretation suffices as long as it (a) can generate differences in epistemic
value (on either the strict or the loose interpretation), and (b) academics who
have produced work of high epistemic value in the past are not particularly
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likely to do so again in the future (although the Matthew effect may create
an impression to the contrary).
What conclusions can one draw about individual superstars in light of
the possibility of lucky superstars? Suppose one thought that academics
who produced work of high epistemic value in the past are likely to do so
again in the future. Strevens seems to endorse this when he writes “I do
not need to argue, I think, that a discovery produced by a scientist with a
demonstrated record of success has more initial credibility than a discovery
produced by an unknown” (Strevens 2006, p. 166).
I have argued that it is possible that the “demonstrated record of success”
was obtained through luck. This does not show that one would be mistaken
to assign more credibility to a discovery made by an academic with such a
record. But it does show that that record is not in itself a decisive argument
for this assignment of credibility. (This is essentially the first argument of
section 5 run in reverse.)
If an academic becomes a superstar through luck, independent of com-
petence (cf. footnote 4), then the epistemic value of her past work is not
predictive of her future work. In fact, her past performance is indistinguish-
able from that of a highly competent academic, while her future performance
is (probabilistically) indistinguishable from that of an average academic.
This undermines the second and third benefits of stratification I identified
in section 5. According to the second benefit, grant-awarding agencies can
use stratification to assess the competence of academics. According to the
third benefit, academics themselves can do the same, assessing in particular
academics outside their own subfield. But these assessments may go awry
if there are lucky superstars. In the worst case (see proposition 1), the vast
majority of these assessments are mistaken.
What about the first benefit, according to which stratification is a nec-
essary condition for maintaining consensus, which is itself a necessary con-
dition for scientific progress? The possibility of lucky superstars undermines
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the argument that those able to affect what counts as the consensus in an
academic community are particularly well-suited for that position. While
competent superstars may be better judges of future work that challenges
or reaffirms the consensus, there is no reason to expect lucky superstars to
be. If academics thought most superstars were lucky rather than competent,
they might no longer rely on superstars’ opinions to determine the direction
of the field, effectively destroying consensus and progress.
However, that point does not affect the claim that stratification may
be necessary for progress. If most academics believe that superstars are
competent—as they seem to do—consensus and the possibility of progress
are maintained (albeit through a kind of “noble lie” if in fact most superstars
are lucky). Perhaps this is the only way to maintain consensus and the
possibility of progress, as Cole and Cole (1973, pp. 77–83) suggest. This is
the only purported benefit of stratification I found in the literature that does
not rely on the competence-based view.
Is it true that consensus and progress are impossible without stratifica-
tion? This is a hard question to answer, as modern academic science has
always been highly stratified. One might construct a model to investigate
under what conditions consensus and progress are possible in a non-stratified
academic community, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. I offer some
informal remarks instead.
The absence of stratification may well prevent academics from judging
those outside their own subfield. But it does not seem to prevent academics
in small communities (say, up to a hundred or so) from learning to trust (or
distrust) each other (Holman and Bruner 2015, section 5). Consensus and
progress would seem to be possible within such communities.
Aggregating the results of these communities would be harder. For one,
it may be impossible to tell for those outside a community whether a given
academic is representative of it. And the communities may be less interested
in unifying their results with those of other communities. Governments and
26
grant-giving agencies may need to play a more active role to extract socially
useful information from such a decentralized academic environment.
These considerations certainly do not show that non-stratified academic
science would be particularly effective. But they show that it is not obviously
true that stratification is necessary for consensus and progress. A more
sustained argument is needed to settle this question one way or the other.
In the absence of such an argument, all the benefits of stratification that
I have identified rely on the possibility of using the stratification of science
to pick out particular academics as highly competent. But if there is a
role for luck, not all superstars are highly competent. Worse, because they
are indistinguishable by past performance, it is impossible to tell a lucky
superstar from a competent one.
The problem could be mitigated if there was a way to show that most
superstars are in fact highly competent. This might appear to be a testable
proposition. Take a random sample of superstars and a random sample of
nobodies, and measure the epistemic value of their next paper. If stratifica-
tion mostly tracks competence, the superstars should produce more valuable
work than the nobodies, whereas if stratification mostly tracks luck, their
work should be of similar epistemic value. Evidence of the former would
suggest that using stratification to assess competence is a mostly reliable
mechanism, and so the identified benefits mostly hold.
The problem is that the only way to measure epistemic value is via other
academics’ assessment. The Matthew effect establishes that academics rate
the work of superstars more highly than that of nobodies even when they
are of similar epistemic value.26 So regardless of whether stratification in
26If I am right that epistemic value can only be measured by academics’ assessments,
how could Merton (1968) establish the Matthew effect in the first place? He noted that
if a superstar and a nobody co-authored a paper together, the superstar received more
credit than the nobody; this obviously controls for epistemic value. He also noted that if
a superstar and a nobody made the same discovery independently, the superstar received
more credit; this arguably also controls for epistemic value. However, these strategies are
not helpful in the measurement problem I describe.
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fact tracks competence or luck, superstars would appear to produce more
valuable work than nobodies.
Thus the Matthew effect makes it impossible to determine whether su-
perstars are mostly competent or mostly lucky. Because the benefits of strat-
ification depend on the assumption that most superstars are competent (in
the absence of an argument that stratification is necessary for progress), it
is impossible to prove that stratification is beneficial, at least in the ways
identified in the literature. This is not an argument that stratification is not
beneficial; merely that it cannot be shown to be.
Having stated this conclusion, I return briefly to some of the assump-
tions of the model. I assumed that academics prefer to read papers of high
epistemic value and that academics know the epistemic value of the papers
produced in the community before they read them.
While these assumptions may be unrealistic, it seems unlikely that re-
laxing them would change the conclusion. I reason as follows. The benefits
of stratification depend on the assumption that superstars are competent.
Competent academics are more likely to produce papers of high epistemic
value. Relaxing either of the assumptions just mentioned would make the
correlation between epistemic value and stratification weaker rather than
stronger. As a result, superstars are less likely to be highly competent. So
relaxing these assumptions does not make it easier to prove that stratification
is beneficial.
7 Conclusion
I have used a formal model to show that a preference for reading papers of
high epistemic value is sufficient to produce social stratification in science.
The model is consistent with a competence-based view of superstars. In
particular, small differences in competence are sufficient to produce extreme
stratification. On this basis, I caution against those who would conclude
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(based on linear models) that the stratification actually observed is too ex-
treme to be explained by competence.
On a competence-based view of superstars, stratification has a number
of benefits to academics and academic institutions. All but one of these
benefits, however, assume that stratification can reliably be used to identify
highly competent academics. The remaining one I found to be underargued.
Luck may also give rise to superstars. In fact, there is some reason to be-
lieve that if luck and competence both give rise to superstars, lucky superstars
are more common than competent ones. Because they are indistinguishable
by past performance, the possibility of lucky superstars prevents the reliable
identification of competence via stratification.
Due to the Matthew effect, it is impossible to measure the ratio of com-
petent to lucky superstars. Since the benefits of stratification rely on that
ratio being high, it is impossible to show that stratification has the benefits
hitherto ascribed to it.
I conclude by raising a few questions for future work. First, what happens
if the model is changed to explicitly consider longer periods of time? While
I have described informally a situation in which multiple iterations of the
model are used successively, interacting with the Matthew effect, capturing
these interactions in a formal model can make my claims more precise.
Second, what would a science without stratification look like? Under what
circumstances are consensus and progress possible? Explicitly considering
an alternative picture of science or academia may also bring into focus other
potential benefits or harms of stratification. Formal models are ideally suited
to investigate counterfactuals like these.
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